From Peer Pressure to Biased Norms

Moti Michaeli and Daniel Spiro

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2017, vol. 9, issue 1, 152-216

Abstract: This paper studies a coordination game between a continuum of players with heterogeneous tastes who perceive peer pressure when behaving differently from each other. It characterizes the conditions under which a social norm--a mode of behavior followed by many--exists in equilibrium and the patterns of norm compliance. The emergent norm may be biased compared to the average taste in society, yet endogenously upheld by the population. Strikingly, a biased norm will, under some circumstances, be more sustainable than a non-biased norm, which may explain the bias of various social and religious norms.

JEL-codes: D11 Z12 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150151
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32)

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