Resale Price Maintenance with Secret Contracts and Retail Service Externalities

Tommy Gabrielsen and Bjørn Olav Johansen ()

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2017, vol. 9, issue 1, 63-87

Abstract: We analyze a setting where a monopolist sells through retailers that set prices and provide valuable but non-contractible services to customers. We assume that contracts are private. We find that purely bilateral price restraints have no effect on the equilibrium outcome and that the standard Bertrand prices and service levels prevail. We also show that if manufacturers can commit to industry-wide resale prices, they can obtain higher prices and service levels but will generally not be able to achieve the fully integrated outcome. Using a specific linear demand system, we find that industry-wide price floors are harmful to consumers.

JEL-codes: D42 D62 D86 L12 L42 L60 L81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140280
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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