Dynamic Agenda Setting

Ying Chen and Hülya Eraslan

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2017, vol. 9, issue 2, 1-32

Abstract: A party in power can address a limited number of issues. What issues to address--the party's agenda--has dynamic implications because it affects what issues will be addressed in the future. We analyze a model in which the incumbent addresses one issue among many and the remaining issues roll over to the next period. We show that no strategic manipulation arises without checks and balances and identify strategic manipulations in the forms of waiting for the moment, seizing the moment, steering, and preemption with checks and balances depending on how power fluctuates. We also discuss efficiency implications.

JEL-codes: C78 D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150298
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Dynamic Agenda Setting (2015)
Working Paper: Dynamic Agenda Setting (2015)
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