Economics at your fingertips  

How Important Can the Non-violation Clause Be for the GATT/WTO?

Robert Staiger () and Alan O. Sykes

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2017, vol. 9, issue 2, 149-87

Abstract: The "non-violation" clause of GATT is Exhibit A for the proposition that international trade agreements are incomplete contracts. According to the terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements, it underpins the success of the GATT/WTO's "shallow integration" approach. Yet the observed role of the non-violation complaint is minimal. We develop a model of non-violation claims in trade agreements, demonstrate that it predicts a minimal on-equilibrium-path role for non-violation claims under reasonable parameter restrictions, and show that the non-violation clause may nevertheless play an important off-equilibrium-path role in the GATT/WTO.

JEL-codes: D74 D86 F12 F13 K33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150139
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf) ... k54N7b3vpke9-0aVYecG (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: How Important can the Non-Violation Clause be for the GATT/WTO? (2013) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics is currently edited by Johannes Hörner

More articles in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().

Page updated 2020-02-16
Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:9:y:2017:i:2:p:149-87