Choice and Matching

Christopher Chambers and M. Bumin Yenmez

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2017, vol. 9, issue 3, 126-47

Abstract: We study path-independent choice rules applied to a matching context. We use a classic representation of these choice rules to introduce a powerful technique for matching theory. Using this technique, we provide a deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-many matching markets with contracts and study its properties. Next, we obtain a compelling comparative static result: if one agent's choice expands, the remaining agents on her side of the market are made worse off, while agents on the other side of the market are made better off. Finally, we establish several results related to path-independent choice rules.

JEL-codes: C78 D11 D71 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150236
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (43)

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