Simultaneous Search and Efficiency of Entry and Search Intensity
Pieter Gautier () and
Christian L. Holzner
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2017, vol. 9, issue 3, 245-82
We consider a model where firms open vacancies and post and commit to a wage mechanism. Search is costly and workers simultaneously apply to multiple jobs. Firms can be connected to multiple workers and workers to multiple firms. We use a new method to derive the expected maximum number of matches in a large market as a function of the number of applications and market tightness. We also derive the conditions under which firm entry, worker participation, and search intensity are socially efficient. Finally, we show that a sequential auction under incomplete information can establish the social optimum and discuss some alternative mechanisms that can, under complete information of the entire network, also deliver social efficiency.
JEL-codes: D12 D44 D83 J23 J31 J64 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20160088
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrie ... _Pbb5UedGvF000t_pQh7 (application/pdf)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrie ... 2uy85YE6dM57rXH3gSxY (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:9:y:2017:i:3:p:245-82
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics is currently edited by Johannes Hörner
More articles in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().