Centralized Decision Making and Informed Lobbying

Rafael Lima, Humberto Moreira and Thierry Verdier

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2017, vol. 9, issue 4, 324-55

Abstract: We address the trade-off between centralized and decentralized decision making subject to influence from privately informed lobbies. We focus on informative equilibria with separating differentiable contribution schedules and identify an information transmission effect under centralized structures. Such effect decreases capture and increases welfare when lobbies have "aligned preferences." The opposite effect holds for "polarized preferences." We present two examples of this framework: local public goods and customs union agreements. Finally, we compare the policy outcomes from this political economy perspective to those under a normative mechanism design approach, and extend our analysis to the discussion of pooling equilibria.

JEL-codes: D72 D82 F13 F15 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150253
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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