Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching

Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Yeon-Koo Che, Parag Pathak, Alvin Roth and Olivier Tercieux

American Economic Review: Insights, 2020, vol. 2, issue 4, 425-42

Abstract: Top trading cycles (TTC ) is Pareto efficient and strategy-proof in priority-based matching, but so are other mechanisms including serial dictatorship. We show that TTC minimizes justified envy among all Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms in one-to-one matching. In many-to-one matching, TTC admits less justified envy than serial dictatorship in an average sense. Empirical evidence from New Orleans OneApp and Boston Public Schools shows that TTC has significantly less justified envy than serial dictatorship.

JEL-codes: C78 D61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

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Working Paper: Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching (2020)
Working Paper: Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching (2020)
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DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20190307

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