Information Design and Strategic Communication

Daniel Krähmer

American Economic Review: Insights, 2021, vol. 3, issue 1, 51-66

Abstract: I study sender-receiver games where the receiver can disclose information to the sender by designing an information structure. I show that by secretly randomizing over information structures, the receiver can virtually attain her complete information payoff even for large conflicts of interest. The key insight is that private knowledge of the information structure induces truthful communication because it allows the receiver to cross-check the consistency of the sender's report.

JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20200012

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