Leaning against the Wind and Crisis Risk

Moritz Schularick, Lucas ter Steege and Felix Ward

American Economic Review: Insights, 2021, vol. 3, issue 2, 199-214

Abstract: Can central banks defuse rising stability risks in financial booms by leaning against the wind with higher interest rates? This paper studies the state-dependent effects of monetary policy on financial crisis risk. Based on the near-universe of advanced economy financial cycles since the nineteenth century, we show that discretionary leaning against the wind policies during credit and asset price booms are more likely to trigger crises than prevent them.

JEL-codes: E43 E44 E52 E58 F33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Leaning against the Wind and Crisis Risk (2021)
Working Paper: Leaning against the Wind and Crisis Risk (2021)
Working Paper: Leaning against the wind and crisis risk (2020)
Working Paper: Leaning against the Wind and Crisis Risk (2020)
Working Paper: Leaning against the wind and crisis risk (2020)
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DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20200310

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