Optimal Information Disclosure in Classic Auctions

Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann, Stephen Morris, Constantine Sorokin and Eyal Winter

American Economic Review: Insights, 2022, vol. 4, issue 3, 371-88

Abstract: We characterize the revenue-maximizing information structure in the second-price auction. The seller faces a trade-off: more information improves the efficiency of the allocation but creates higher information rents for bidders. The information disclosure policy that maximizes the revenue of the seller is to fully reveal low values (where competition is high) but to pool high values (where competition is low). The size of the pool is determined by a critical quantile that is independent of the distribution of values and only dependent on the number of bidders. We discuss how this policy provides a rationale for conflation in digital advertising.

JEL-codes: D44 D82 D83 M37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20210504

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