Robust Information Transmission

Francesc Dilme

American Economic Review: Insights, 2023, vol. 5, issue 1, 111-24

Abstract: This paper investigates robust information transmission between a sender and a receiver in the Crawford and Sobel (1982) model. We characterize behavior that remains equilibrium behavior independently of the form of a small communication cost. Under standard conditions, we find that an equilibrium outcome is robust if and only if it features a maximal number of on-path actions and each is induced by a single message. The result extends regardless of the direction of the bias, the number of available messages, or whether the objectives of the sender and the receiver are aligned.

JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20210643

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