Analyzing the Airwaves Auction

Randolph McAfee and John McMillan

Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1996, vol. 10, issue 1, 159-175

Abstract: The design of the Federal Communications Commission spectrum license auction is a case study in the application of economic theory. Auction theory helped address policy questions such as whether an open auction or a sealed-bid auction should be used; whether the licenses should be auctioned sequentially or simultaneously; whether the government should allow bids for combinations of licenses or accept only single-license bids; how the auction should should be structured to promote the interests of minority-owned and other designated firms; whether the government should impose royalties or reserve prices; and how much the bidders should be informed about their competition.

JEL-codes: D44 D45 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.10.1.159
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (166)

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