Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage

Shelly Lundberg and Robert Pollak

Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1996, vol. 10, issue 4, 139-158

Abstract: The standard economic model of the family is a 'common preference' model that assumes that a family maximizes a single utility function and implies that family behavior is independent of which individuals receive income or control resources. In recent years, this model has been challenged by game-theoretic models of marriage that do not impose 'pooling' and are, therefore, consistent with empirical evidence that income controlled by husbands and wives does have different effects on family behavior. In this paper, the authors review a number of simple bargaining models and relevant empirical evidence, and discuss their implications for distribution within marriage.

JEL-codes: J12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.10.4.139
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (513)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.10.4.139 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:jecper:v:10:y:1996:i:4:p:139-58

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Perspectives is currently edited by Enrico Moretti

More articles in Journal of Economic Perspectives from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().