Rethinking Federalism

Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld

Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1997, vol. 11, issue 4, 43-64

Abstract: The appropriate federal structure of government is now a policy issue of major debate. This paper identifies three approaches and compares their strengths and weaknesses. Economic federalism recommends the use of competitive communities for the provision of congestible local goods and a strong central government for the provision of pure public goods and spillovers. Cooperative federalism recommends intercommunity agreements; democratic federalism prefers a majority-rule representative legislature. Efficiency will sometimes conflict with other constitutional objectives--political participation and the protection of rights--and compromises will often be required.

JEL-codes: H11 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.11.4.43
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (158)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.11.4.43 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:jecper:v:11:y:1997:i:4:p:43-64

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Perspectives is currently edited by Enrico Moretti

More articles in Journal of Economic Perspectives from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().