Takings, Compensation and Endangered Species Protection on Private Lands

Robert Innes (), Stephen Polasky and John Tschirhart ()

Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1998, vol. 12, issue 3, 35-52

Abstract: Preserving endangered species on private land benefits the public, but may confer cost on landowners if property is 'taken.' Government compensation to landowners can offset costs, although the Endangered Species Act does not require compensation. The authors survey private economic incentives for species preservation created by alternative property rights and compensation regimes. Compensation will effect investments in land and the willingness of landowners to collect and impart information about their land's preservation value. The authors also address government incentives and how deadweight costs of compensation will influence design of property rights, and how government's susceptibility to interest group pressure may cause inefficient preservation.

JEL-codes: K11 K32 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.12.3.35
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (47)

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