Policy Watch: The Marriage Penalty

James Alm (), Stacy Dickert-Conlin () and Leslie A. Whittington

Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1999, vol. 13, issue 3, 193-204

Abstract: Many government programs have implicit penalties or subsidies for marriage. For example, many couples pay higher income taxes when married than their combined tax liabilities as single filers, while many other couples receive a marriage subsidy because their joint taxes fall with marriage. Likewise, most low-income couples are eligible for higher welfare benefits if they are separated rather than married. This article discusses the marriage penalty, with a particular focus on tax and transfer programs. Why does it exist? Who faces it? To what extent does it affect marriage and labor market behavior? What tradeoffs are involved in reducing it?

JEL-codes: H24 H31 J12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.13.3.193
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (54)

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