Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms

Elinor Ostrom

Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2000, vol. 14, issue 3, 137-158

Abstract: I assume multiple types of players--"rational egoists," as well as "conditional cooperators" and "willing punishers"--in models of nonmarket behavior. I use an indirect evolutionary approach to explain how multiple types of players could survive and flourish in social dilemma situations. Contextual variables that enhance knowledge about past behavior assist in explaining the origin of collective action. Among the important contextual variables are types of goods, types of groups, and rules that groups use to provide and allocate goods. Finally, I reexamine a series of design principles that were derived earlier from an examination of extensive case materials.

JEL-codes: Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.14.3.137
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (956)

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