Corporate Conflicts of Interest

Joel S. Demski

Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2003, vol. 17, issue 2, 51-72

Abstract: This paper surveys conflicts of interest in the corporate governance arena, with emphasis on auditors, boards of directors, analysts and investment bankers, regulators, management, attorneys and investors. Enron provides a host of examples as well. I stress the multifaceted nature of these conflicts, and the fact most research looks at some conflicts, such as auditor independence, absent the larger setting and potential interactions among various players. I further speculate herding behavior is an important explanatory device in understanding periodic failures.

Date: 2003
Note: DOI: 10.1257/089533003765888421
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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