Financial Regulation: Still Unsettled a Decade after the Crisis
Daniel K. Tarullo
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2019, vol. 33, issue 1, 61-80
Abstract:
A decade after the darkest moments of the financial crisis, both the US financial system and the legal framework for its regulation are still in flux. The post-crisis regulatory framework has made systemically important banks much more resilient. They are substantially better capitalized and less dependent on runnable short-term funding. But the current regulatory framework does not deal effectively with threats to financial stability outside the perimeter of regulated banking organizations, notably from forms of shadow banking. Moreover, with the political tide having for the moment turned decisively toward deregulation, there is some question whether the resiliency improvements of the largest banks will be preserved. This article assesses the accomplishments, unfinished business, and outstanding issues in the post-crisis approach to prudential regulation.
JEL-codes: E32 E44 G01 G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.33.1.61
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