Behavioral Incentive Compatibility and Empirically Informed Welfare Analysis: An Introductory Guide

Alex Rees-Jones

Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2024, vol. 38, issue 4, 155-74

Abstract: A growing body of research conducts welfare analysis that assumes behavioral incentive compatibility—that is, that behavior is governed by pursuit of incentives conditional on modeled imperfections in decision-making. In this article, I present several successful examples of studies that apply this approach and I use them to illustrate guidance for pursuing this type of analysis.

JEL-codes: D47 D60 D91 G22 H25 I13 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1257/jep.38.4.155

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