Rationality in Extensive-Form Games
Philip Reny ()
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1992, vol. 6, issue 4, 103-118
Let us adopt the classical point of view that a theory of games is a description of "rational" behavior. Consequently, equipped with a book entitled "Theory of Games," any individual in any strategic situation need only consult the book to make a "rational" decision. One of the questions to address in this context is indeed whether or not strategies other than those provided by backward induction can ever appear in such a book. In offering an answer, we shall also explore the logical limits within which any "Theory of Games" must operate.
JEL-codes: C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.6.4.103
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:jecper:v:6:y:1992:i:4:p:103-18
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