Rationality in Extensive-Form Games

Philip Reny ()

Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1992, vol. 6, issue 4, 103-118

Abstract: Let us adopt the classical point of view that a theory of games is a description of "rational" behavior. Consequently, equipped with a book entitled "Theory of Games," any individual in any strategic situation need only consult the book to make a "rational" decision. One of the questions to address in this context is indeed whether or not strategies other than those provided by backward induction can ever appear in such a book. In offering an answer, we shall also explore the logical limits within which any "Theory of Games" must operate.

JEL-codes: C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1992
Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.6.4.103
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (51)

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