Selling Spectrum Rights

John McMillan

Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1994, vol. 8, issue 3, 145-162

Abstract: The design of the FCC spectrum-license auction is a case study in the application of economic theory. Auction theory helped address policy questions such as: Should an open auction or a sealed-bid auction be used? Should the licenses be auctioned sequentially or simultaneously? Should the government allow bids for combinations of licenses, or should it accept only single-license bids? How should the auction be structured to promote the interests of minority-owned and other designated firms? Should the government impose royalties or reserve prices? How much should the bidders be informed about their competition?

JEL-codes: D44 L96 L98 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.8.3.145
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (244)

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