Universal Health Insurance in the Clinton Plan: Coverage as a Tax-Financed Public Good

Mark V. Pauly

Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1994, vol. 8, issue 3, 45-53

Abstract: The financing arrangements embodied in the Clinton health reform plan involve some important differences in the way in which public goods are usually financed. The subsidies to small, low-wage firms mandated to provide benefits distort markets in both labor and products, and offer incentives for the creation of small firms. In addition, the financing scheme implicitly envisions a head tax on families at modest income levels but offers a possible rationale for it. Nevertheless, the main reason for many of the financing features appears to be an attempt to hold down the apparent budgetary cost of universal coverage.

JEL-codes: I11 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.8.3.45
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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