Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process

William P. Rogerson

Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1994, vol. 8, issue 4, 65-90

Abstract: This paper describes some of the insights that the economic theory of incentives can contribute to defense procurement policy analysis. It describes the underlying incentive problems that shape the defense procurement problem, the nature of current institutions and how they affect actors' behavior, and possible directions for improving the procurement process suggested by viewing it as a solution to a complex set of incentive problems. Incentive problems between government and defense firms and incentive problems within government are both considered.

JEL-codes: H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.8.4.65
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (67)

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