An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes

Jonathan Levin and Barry Nalebuff

Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1995, vol. 9, issue 1, 3-26

Abstract: Many researchers, following Kenneth Arrow's lead, have concerned themselves with stating various desirable or undesirable criteria and attempting to classify vote-counting systems. This paper moves away from theoretical discussions: the authors illustrate and motivate a variety of alternatives to plurality rule. The authors demonstrate by example how these alternatives, such as min-max majority and single transferable vote, work and where they fail. In choosing between flawed alternatives, which methods are best suited for selecting a single winner versus ranking the candidates? Does one approach favor candidates with loyal minorities or candidates with broad appeal? How do the authors achieve a representative outcome?

JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.9.1.3
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (38)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.9.1.3 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:jecper:v:9:y:1995:i:1:p:3-26

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Perspectives is currently edited by Enrico Moretti

More articles in Journal of Economic Perspectives from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().