Optimal Voting Rules

H. Young

Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1995, vol. 9, issue 1, 51-64

Abstract: Modern social choice theory, following Kenneth Arrow, treats voting as a method for aggregating diverse preferences and values. An earlier view, initiated by Marquis de Condorcet, is that voting is a method for aggregating information. Voters' opinions differ because they make errors of judgment; absent these errors they would all agree on the best choice. The goal is to design a voting rule that identifies the best choice with highest probability. This paper examines maximum likelihood estimation. Surprisingly, the optimal rule can also be axiomatized by variations of Arrow's axioms.

JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.9.1.51
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (89)

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