Using District Magnitude to Regulate Political Party Competition

Douglas W. Rae

Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1995, vol. 9, issue 1, 65-75

Abstract: This is an essay about the use of districting systems to regulate electoral outcomes and the evolution of party systems. By changing the number of seats from each district, a balance can be struck between the often conflicting goals of minority representation and defractionalization. Defractionalization is the process of forming broad-based governing majorities. Special attention is given to the electoral systems of Italy, Spain, and the United States. In the case of the United States, the author recommends a proportional representation system that mixes high-magnitude districts that encourage minority representation and low-magnitude districts that promote defractionalization.

JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.9.1.65
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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