Risk-Bearing and the Choice of Contract Forms for Oil Exploration and Development

Charles R. Blitzer, Donald Lessard () and James L. Paddock

The Energy Journal, 1984, vol. Volume 5, issue Number 1, 1-28

Abstract: The structure of taxes and fiscal contracts between host countries and foreign companies has major implications for the success of oil development projects. This is because of several key characteristics of such projects: large investment outlays, long lead times to project completion, and long periods of project output and payout. These characteristics usually are coupled with an incomplete sharing of information and technology, and significant differences in the ability of the various parties to bear the risks involved. These characteristics often lead to unstable contracts and, in many cases, to the failure to develop projects that are economically attractive in aggregate terms but unattractive to one or both parties because of uncertainties over sharing project risks and returns.

JEL-codes: F0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1984
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