EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

OPEC Behaviour Under Falling Prices: Implications For Cartel Stability

Clifton T. Jones

The Energy Journal, 1990, vol. Volume 11, issue Number 3, 117-130

Abstract: The surprising extended decline in real oil prices during the 1980s has raised the question of OPEC's continued viability as a price-setting cartel. In response, Griffin's (1985) tests of alternative hypotheses about OPEC behaviour performed over a period of generally rising prices (1971:1-1983:III) are repeated for the more recent period of falling prices (1983:IV-198R•1V), yielding the same general conclusions: most OPEC members continue to behave in a 'partial market sharing" way, while most non-OPEC oil producers do not. Thus the evidence suggests that recent oil price reductions are more the result of deliberate output adjustments by the cartel than the unintentional outcome of a breakdown in cartel discipline on the way to eventual collapse.

JEL-codes: F0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1990
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (42) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.iaee.org/en/publications/ejarticle.aspx?id=2019 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to IAEE members and subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aen:journl:1990v11-03-a06

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.iaee.org/en/publications/ejsearch.aspx

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The Energy Journal from International Association for Energy Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by David Williams ().

 
Page updated 2020-09-16
Handle: RePEc:aen:journl:1990v11-03-a06