Toward an Optimal Oil and Gas Leasing System

Walter J. Mead

The Energy Journal, 1994, vol. Volume15, issue Number 4, 1-18

Abstract: The four principal leasing systems-work program, royalty, profit share (including rent resource tax), and bonus bidding are reviewed relative to their efficiency in maximizing and collecting the present value of economic rents. Empirical research is shown to support theoretical conclusions that the most efficient system appears to be bonus bidding, without a fixed royalty, with leases issued in perpetuity, with environmental and other regulations required to pass a benefit/cost test, and with elimination of any nationalistic or other barriers to entry.

JEL-codes: F0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.iaee.org/en/publications/ejarticle.aspx?id=1176 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to IAEE members and subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aen:journl:1994v15-04-a01

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.iaee.org/en/publications/ejsearch.aspx

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The Energy Journal from International Association for Energy Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by David Williams ().