The Efficiency of Multi-Unit Electricity Auctions

Wedad Elmaghraby and Shmuel S. Oren

The Energy Journal, 1999, vol. Volume20, issue Number 4, 89-116

Abstract: Using a complete information game-theoretic model, we analyze the performance of different electricity auction structures in attaining efficiency (i. e., least-cost dispatch). We find that an auction structure where generators are allowed to bid for load "slices" outperforms an auction structure where generators submit bids for different hours in the day.

JEL-codes: F0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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