Electricity liberalization in Britain: The quest for a satisfactory wholesale market design

David M Newbery

The Energy Journal, 2005, vol. Volume 26, issue Special Issue, 43-70

Abstract: Britain was the exemplar of electricity market reform, demonstrating the importance of ownership unbundling and workable competition in generation and supply. Privatisation created de facto duopolies that supported increasing price-cost margins and induced excessive (English) entry. Concentration was ended by trading horizontal for vertical integration in subsequent mergers. Competition arrived just as the Pool was replaced by New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) intended to address its claimed shortcomings. NETA cost over £700 million, and had ambiguous market impacts. Prices fell dramatically as a result of (pre-NETA) competition, generating companies withdrew plant, causing fears about security of supply and a subsequent widening of price-cost margins.

JEL-codes: F0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Working Paper: Electricity Liberalisation in Britain: the quest for a satisfactory wholesale market design (2004)
Working Paper: Electricity liberalisation in Britain: the quest for a satisfactory wholesale market design (2004)
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