Nuclear Capacity Auctions
Sven-Olof Fridolfsson and Thomas P. Tangeras
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Thomas Tangerås () and
The Energy Journal, 2015, vol. Volume 36, issue Number 3
We propose nuclear capacity auctions as a means to correcting the incentives for investing in nuclear power. In particular, capacity auctions open the market for large-scale entry by outside firms. Requiring licensees to sell a share of capacity as virtual power plant contracts increases auction efficiency by mitigating incumbent producers' incentive to bid for market power. A motivating example is Sweden's policy reversal to allow new nuclear power to replace old reactors.
JEL-codes: F0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Nuclear Capacity Auctions (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aen:journl:ej36-3-tangeras
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