Deregulation and Investment in Generation Capacity: Evidence from Nuclear Power Uprates in the United States
Chen-Hao Tsai and
Andrew N. Kleit
The Energy Journal, 2017, vol. Volume 38, issue Number 3
Nuclear power uprates are investments in generation capacity that enable reactors to operate beyond their original power limit. We find that owners of deregulated reactors are more likely to make investment in power uprates. Moreover, after deregulation owners of boiling water reactors are more likely to choose Extended Power Uprates (EPUs) that could add up to 20 percent of the original power, but owners of pressurized water reactors, another type of reactors for which EPUs are more technically challenging, tend to select other types of uprates that add less of reactor power. Deregulation incentivizes reactor owners to pursue profitable investments and propels them to make careful investment decisions more consistent with the technological nature of their plants.
JEL-codes: F0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to IAEE members and subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aen:journl:ej38-3-lei
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in The Energy Journal from International Association for Energy Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by David Williams ().