Ex-ante Preisgestaltung auf Festnetzendkundenmärkten – Wettbewerbsprobleme und Regulierungsoptionen

Wolfgang Briglauer

Schmollers Jahrbuch : Journal of Applied Social Science Studies / Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, 2006, vol. 126, issue 4, 535-564

Abstract: For electronic communications markets a new regulatory framework was enacted and should have been transformed into national law by all member states by summer 2003. On whole, the new regulatory framework is designed as to ensure the transition to general competition law. In concrete, the directives (especially Article 14-16 of the Framework Directive) in conjunction with the European Commission´s SMP-Guidelines outline a three-stage analysis process. In this paper we will focus on the third layer (i.e. regulation) with respect to retail voice telephony markets. Furthermore we will only emphasize on price regulation as this mode of ex-ante regulation provokes by far most controversy. Regarding price regulation within European Member states, we find that essentially two different methodologies were adopted since liberalisation of communications markets: Price Caps on the one hand and ex-ante approval mechanisms based on cost orientation on the other hand. Quite contrary to the traditional findings we will produce a result after what ex-ante approval mechanisms are comparatively more suitable for addressing the specific competition problems of the current market phase. These results are reinforced when examining the incumbent’s tariff structure where we find intense use of two-part tariffs. In general (assuming sufficiently rational consumer behaviour) such multi-part tariffs have welfare-enhancing effects in case of classical monopoly regulation. But when competition is introduced these tariffs might give rise for anticompetitive behaviour (horizontal leveraging of market power) and things then become ambiguous. Although incumbents are subject to ex-ante price regulation such behavioural strategies are quite common, as ex-ante price regulation at the retail level does not imply that prices are dictated rather significant degrees of freedom concerning price setting behaviour typically remain.

JEL-codes: L12 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aeq:aeqsjb:v126_y2006_i4_q4_p535-564

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.duncker-h ... llersjahrbuch-1.html

Access Statistics for this article

Schmollers Jahrbuch : Journal of Applied Social Science Studies / Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften is currently edited by Gert G. Wagner and Joachim Wagner

More articles in Schmollers Jahrbuch : Journal of Applied Social Science Studies / Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften from Duncker & Humblot, Berlin
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Gabriele Freudenmann ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).