RESERVATION PRICES AND PRE-AUCTION ESTIMATES: A STUDY IN ABSTRACT ART

Calin Valsan () and Robert Sproule
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Calin Valsan: Bishop’s University, Lennoxville, Quebec

The AMFITEATRU ECONOMIC journal, 2008, vol. 10, issue 24, 257-272

Abstract: Using a sample of European abstract art we show that reservation prices constrain pre-auction estimates in such a way that we are more likely to observe overestimation relative to the midpoint of the estimation window. At the same time, we also find that the low pre-auction estimate is a more powerful, accurate and precise predictor of hammer prices than the high estimate.

Keywords: Art Auctions; Abstract Art; Pre-auction Estimates; Reservation Price; Bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 G12 Z11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aes:amfeco:v:10:y:2008:i:24:p:257-272

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