Fertility, Education, and Market Failures

Sylvain Dessy () and Stephane Pallage
Additional contact information
Sylvain Dessy: Departement d'economique, Universite Laval, Sainte-Foy, QC

Journal of African Development, 2002, vol. 5, issue 2, 71-85

Abstract: We show that coordination failures may be part of an explanation for the demographic differences between rich and poor countries and their differing attitudes towards the use of child labor. Our analysis is carried out within a two-period, general equilibrium model with endogenous fertility, parental investment in children's education and firms' tradeoff between traditional technologies and the adoption of skill-intensive, modern ones. The model exhibits multiple equilibria due to the lack of a coordination mechanism between parental decisions on the quantity and the quality of children and entrepreneurs' technology choices.

Keywords: Endogenous fertility; education; child labor; skill-biased technology; welfare; multiple equilibria; coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I20 J13 J20 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.afeawpapers.org/RePEc/afe/afe-journl/wp ... JAD_vol5_N2_Chp4.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Fertility, Education, and Market Failures (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:afe:journl:v:5:y:2002:i:2:p:71-85

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of African Development from African Finance and Economic Association (AFEA) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Nsiah ().