ASSESSING THE EFFICIENCY OF THE BRAZILIAN ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATION: A GAME THEORETIC APPROACH

Ricardo Azevedo Araújo ()
Additional contact information
Ricardo Azevedo Araújo: Universidade de Brasília (UNB)
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Ricardo Azevedo Araujo

Revista de Economia Mackenzie (REM), 2009, vol. 7, issue 1, 30-42

Abstract: In this paper the efficiency of the Brazilian anti-money laundering regula-tion is assessed by using a game theoretic approach. The analysis shows that, despite the efforts of the Brazilian authorities to combat money laundering, the efficiency of the Brazilian regulation has been damaged by a rigid practice of bank secrecy and a low probability of punishment of financial institutions that do not report suspicious activities.

Keywords: Anti-money laundering regulation; Bank secrecy; Game theory. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://editorarevistas.mackenzie.br/index.php/rem/article/view/504/327 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aft:journl:v:7:1:2009:jan:apr:p:30-42

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revista de Economia Mackenzie (REM) from Mackenzie Presbyterian University, Social and Applied Sciences Center Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Instituto Presbiteriano Mackenzie (IPM) ().