My colleague is corrupt: Information disclosure to control corruption

Indervir Singh and Ashapurna Baruah
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Ashapurna Baruah: Akal University, India

Theoretical and Applied Economics, 2021, vol. XXVIII, issue 1(626), Spring, 311-316

Abstract: The paper argues that the co-workers of a corrupt public official are in the best position to provide proof of corruption. It, with the help of a game-theoretic model, discusses the incentive structure that will allow a co-worker to disclose the information on a corrupt public servant. The study argues that incentives for the co-worker may work best if they are based on the cost of disclosing the information and are contingent upon successfully proving corruption.

Keywords: corruption; co-worker; information disclosure. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:agr:journl:v:1(626):y:2021:i:1(626):p:311-316

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