Optimal Licensing Contracts with Three Innovation Types

Daniela Marinescu and Dumitru Marin
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Daniela Marinescu: Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies
Dumitru Marin: Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies

Theoretical and Applied Economics, 2011, vol. XVIII(2011), issue 10(563), 5-22

Abstract: In the paper we analyze the features of the optimal licensing contracts in the situation of asymmetric information between the license’s owner and the potential buyer. The approach is based on a classical model of adverse selection first proposed by Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (1991) and solved in an alternative way, using the informational rents as variables, by Marinescu and Marin (2011). Their model is extended in the present paper by assuming that the adverse selection parameter can have one of three possible values (corresponding to three possible types of innovations).

Keywords: optimal contract; innovation; adverse selection; informational rents. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:agr:journl:v:10(563):y:2011:i:10(563):p:5-22

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