INFLATION CONTROL UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF A CENTRAL BANK WHICH IS NOT INDEPENDENT

Angelica Băcescu-Cărbunaru and Silvia-Elena Cristache
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Angelica Băcescu-Cărbunaru: Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies
Silvia-Elena Cristache: Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies

Theoretical and Applied Economics, 2009, vol. 12(541)(supplement), issue 12(541)(supplement), 262-265

Abstract: Starting with the idea that the main monetary problem of a country is to assure national monetary stability and price stability, it is analyzed the possibility to control inflation under the conditions of a central bank which is not independent. It is a distinction between independence of tools and independence of central bank purposes because monetary policy purposes are set up by the legislative, while tools necessary to reach these purposes represent an attribute of Central Bank. Finally, we conclude that central bank own decisions influence both the government behavior and private sector behavior.

Keywords: price general index; inflation control; conservative banker; central banker; main agent model. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:agr:journl:v:12(541)(supplement):y:2009:i:12(541)(supplement):p:262-265

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