MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIUM IN DECENTRALIZED COMMERCE AND NEGOTIATIONS MODELS

Sandu Cătălin Sin
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Sandu Cătălin Sin: Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest

Theoretical and Applied Economics, 2007, vol. 6(511)(supplement)(vol2), issue 6(511)(supplement)(vol2), 219-230

Abstract: In a market in witch the growth of the population is determined endogenous we will try to model it. The buyers and the salesmen are arbitrary distributed. Once they enter the market they start a process of bilateral non-cooperative negotiation. We will impose the idea that for the methods of general allocation between the buyers and the salesmen leads in most cases to multiple equilibrium. Up to 4 equilibrium can appear and can always be ordered according to the population dimension. In some conditions all the equilibrium can be Parreto-optimal. This sum of equilibrium depends on the relative mass of the population and of different types of potentials understanding, the cost of entering the market and the degree of difference between agencies are the same.

Keywords: buyers; high cost sellers; low cost sellers; multiples equilibriums; the Pareto dominated equilibrium. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:agr:journl:v:6(511)(supplement)(vol2):y:2007:i:6(511)(supplement)(vol2):p:219-230

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