Optimal Licensing Contracts with Adverse Selection and Informational Rents

Daniela Marinescu and Dumitru Marin
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Daniela Marinescu: Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies
Dumitru Marin: Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies

Theoretical and Applied Economics, 2011, vol. XVIII(2011), issue 6(559), 27-46

Abstract: In the paper we analyse a model for determining the optimal licensing contract in both situations of symmetric and asymmetric information between the license’s owner and the potential buyer. Next we present another way of solving the corresponding adverse selection model, using the informational rents as variables. This approach is different from that of Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo.

Keywords: optimal contract; innovation; adverse selection; informational rents. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:agr:journl:v:6(559):y:2011:i:6(559):p:27-46

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