Central Bank independence

Vasile Dedu () and Tiberiu Stoica
Additional contact information
Tiberiu Stoica: Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies

Theoretical and Applied Economics, 2012, vol. XVIII(2012), issue 8(573), 97-102

Abstract: In this paper we present the key aspects regarding central bank’s independence. Most economists consider that the factor which positively influences the efficiency of monetary policy measures is the high independence of the central bank. We determined that the National Bank of Romania (NBR) has a high degree of independence. NBR has both goal and instrument independence. We also consider that the hike of NBR’s independence played an important role in the significant disinflation process, as headline inflation dropped inside the targeted band of 3% ± 1 percentage point recently.

Keywords: central bank independence; monetary policy; Great Moderation; inflation; output. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://store.ectap.ro/articole/765.pdf (application/pdf)
http://www.ectap.ro/articol.php?id=765&rid=89 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:agr:journl:v:8(573):y:2012:i:8(573):p:97-102

Access Statistics for this article

Theoretical and Applied Economics is currently edited by Mircea Dinu

More articles in Theoretical and Applied Economics from Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania / Editura Economica Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mircea Dinu ().