Financial services authority and moral hazard

Mitica Pepi
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Mitica Pepi: University of Ovidius Constanta, Romania

Theoretical and Applied Economics, 2014, vol. XXI, issue Special, 190-214

Abstract: Moral hazard played an influential role in the shape of the post-crisis policy debate on the role and limits of optimal financial regulation as a means of constraining excessive risktaking socially. At the same time, however, our understanding of moral hazard - potential sources, its impact on financial institutions and markets, and appropriate regulatory responses - is far from complete. What if the resident moral hazard is in the financial system? How does it influence the decisions of market participants, financial regulators, and policy makers elected? How can we identify and measure the impact? What role financial regulation plays in generating it? And the most important thing, you can play regular role in preventing - or at least minimize - the harmful effects?

Keywords: moral hazard; asymmetric information; regulatory institutions; financial services; markets. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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