Information asymmetry and technical efficiency: Case of a panel of Tunisian insurance companies

Chiraz Feki
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Chiraz Feki: University of Sfax, Tunisia

Theoretical and Applied Economics, 2016, vol. XXIII, issue 4(609), Winter, 299-314

Abstract: The problem of the information asymmetry affects all the insurance sectors namely the one that exists in Tunisia. This problem of asymmetry entails essentially two major problems, such as the adverse selection and the moral hazard. These problems of adverse selection and moral hazard cause perverse effects on the productivity of the insurance companies and consequently on their productive efficiency. The objective of this research work is, on the one hand, to theoretically analyze the effects of the information asymmetry on the insurance functioning and, on the other hand, to estimate the technical efficiency of the Tunisian companies while taking account this problem which remains up to now unsolved.

Keywords: information asymmetric; technical efficiency; insurance companies; parametric approach. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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