Economics at your fingertips  

Job complexity and wage bargaining

Samir Amine
Additional contact information
Samir Amine: Université du Québec en Outaouais and CIRANO, Canada

Theoretical and Applied Economics, 2017, vol. XXIV, issue 1(610), Spring, 189-196

Abstract: The objective of this paper is to qualify and discuss the effects of public policies according to bargaining solution used between workers and firms. We compare the effects of three solutions, Nash, Kalai-Smorod-insky and Equal-Sacrifice in a matching model where the job complexity is endogenous and workers are differentiated by their qualification level. We show that the choice of solution is extremely important since the effects of unemployment benefits on unemployment, labor market participation and on the job complexity can be completely opposite.

Keywords: Bargaining; Nash; Kalai-Smorodinsky; Equal-Sacrifice; Complexity; Unemployment benefits. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf) (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this article

Theoretical and Applied Economics is currently edited by Marin Dinu

More articles in Theoretical and Applied Economics from Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania - AGER Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Marin Dinu ().

Page updated 2017-09-29
Handle: RePEc:agr:journl:v:xxiv:y:2017:i:1(610):p:189-196