Strategic issues in global climate change policy

Harry Clarke

Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 2010, vol. 54, issue 2, 20

Abstract: An analysis of prospects for deriving self-enforcing, global, greenhouse gas emission mitigation agreements is provided. Policy spillovers and carbon leakages are accounted for. Situations where mitigation effort should be concentrated in particular countries and where efficient outcomes can be fostered by international trade in emissions permits are discussed. The use of auxiliary policies to transform intractable Prisoner’s Dilemma incentive problems to more tractable problems, the role of policy commitments and the strategic implications of ‘no regret’ and ‘adaptation’ policies are analysed. Dynamic and repeated game formulations are outlined.

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/162001/files/j.1467-8489.2010.00485.x.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic issues in global climate change policy * (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aareaj:162001

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.162001

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics from Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().