A GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF TURKISH ACCESSION TO A EUROPEAN CUSTOMS UNION

P. Lynn Kennedy and Cemal Atici

Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, 1999, vol. 28, issue 2, 11

Abstract: The entrance of additional countries into a European customs union, in this case Turkey, and its impact on agriculture are examined. Results from a trade simulation model are used as components of a Political Preference Function and utilized within a game theoretic framework to identify the optimal strategies for Turkey, the EU, and the U.S. Turkey's best interest, from an agricultural perspective, involves adoption of agreements made in the Uruguay round of GATT as a developing country rather than applying EU protection. Although free trade is not the optimal solution, simulations indicate that the solution does involve the reduction of agricultural protection levels.

Keywords: International; Relations/Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/31289/files/28020147.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:arerjl:31289

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.31289

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Agricultural and Resource Economics Review from Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().